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Abstract
Earlier social scientists (e.g., Durkheim 1915/1962; Gentile 2006; Le Bon 1895/1960; Mosca 1939/1980) have
suggested analogies between political movements and religions. However, we are not aware of scholars who have
explicitly looked at American political campaigns as potentially quasi-religious movements. We examined film
of 2016 rallies for Donald Trump and Hillary Clinton to see the degree to which there were traces of sacralized
objects, rituals and beliefs, the three defining characteristics of religions, according to Emile Durkheim. We found
enough evidence to infer that both of the campaigns were quasi-religious. The two campaigns were quasi-religious
to different degrees, however, with Trump and his campaign seeming to indulge quasi-religious symbolism and
behavior more than Clinton and her campaign. To the degree that the quasi-religious nature of campaigns may
help to understand the fervor of supporters, we think that this kind of analysis may be worth even more attention
by sociologists and other social scientists.
Keywords: quasi-religious, sacralization, sacred objects, ritual, beliefs, politics as religion
Introduction
This article’s origin can be traced to reading, and
reflecting on, a single essay. In this case, the essay was
Marci Cottingham’s (2015). “The Terrible Towel and
Fair-Weather Fans: Steelers Nation as a Quasi-Religion.”
Based on Emile Durkheim’s work (1912/1965),
Cottingham (2015) used a functionalist model to
make the case that Pittsburgh Steelers fandom is, as
her title suggests, a quasi-religion. The “terrible towel”
mentioned in the title of her essay, Cottingham (2015)
argues, is a sacred object for Steelers fans.
Before doing the research for this article, we paid
reasonably close attention to the 2016 U. S. presidential
campaigns. Therefore, we were fairly confident that both
Donald Trump’s and Hillary Clinton’s campaign had
been led by someone who’d attained a kind of cult status
among a substantial portion of the American populace.
This observation led us to speculate that political
campaigns themselves might be seen as quasi-religious

in nature. Subsequently, we read various other authors
who had applied the concept of quasi-religion to sports
(Brody 1979), back-to-land movements (Brinkerhoff
and Jacob 1987), vegetarianism (Hamilton 2000), and
conspiracy theories (Frank and Bauer 2013). Based
on these sources, it seemed that the concept might be
fruitfully applied to political campaigns, as well.
Over time, both major candidates for the 2016 U. S.
presidency were called out for being cult leaders. This
calling out was frequently done by journalists who
clearly disliked the candidates or their policies, writers
who were using the term “cult leader” in a pejorative
sense. After the final presidential debate, for example,
one conservative blogger inferred that “Clinton wants
to be the leader of America’s suicide cult,” so dangerous
were her economic, cultural, health, open borders and
“vaccine” policies, among others (Adams 2016).
Donald Trump, possibly because he was the eventual
winner of the election, has perhaps garnered even
more sustained attention as a potential cult leader.

Mary Ellen Fernandez and Roger Clark
Commentators pointed to his cult status even during
the campaign. Shortly after the Republican convention,
for example, Rebecca Nelson picked up on what she saw
as his messianic claim that the country was in “crisis”
and that he—and only he—could get it back on track
(2016). She believed that this was clear evidence that
he considered himself a cult leader and found evidence
that many of his followers saw him that way as well.
The claim that Trump followers constitute a “dangerous
cult” has persisted after his election (e.g., Aslan 2017).1
We thought that, if analysts like Cottingham could find
evidence of quasi-religiosity among fans of a football
team, then we might do so among those who participated
in the campaigns of both Trump and Clinton.
As we read further, we discovered that the concept
of politics as religion or quasi-religion already had
a substantial pedigree (e.g., Durkheim 1965 [1912];
Eliade1987 [1957]; Gentile 2006; Le Bon 1960 [1895];
Mosca 2015 [1939]). Mosca, considered a founder of
modern political science, in his book The Ruling Class
(1938/1980) suggested that political parties “ultimately
are quasi-religions stripped of the divine element” (p.
283). Mosca believed that the ritualistic nature of parties
and political movements is, like those of religious sects,
used to manipulate the masses. In fact, Mosca (1980:
163-198) devoted a whole chapter to the similarities
among “churches, parties and sects.”
Historian of religion Mircea Eliade asserted in The
Sacred and the Profane (1957/1959) that, although
modern humans may see themselves as non-religious,
“they still behave religiously, even though they are not
aware of it” (1959: 204). This behavior, he claims, can
be seen in political movements, especially writ large.
Eliade points, for example, to the ways Karl Marx used
various religious myths to construct his view of history.
For example, Marx used the myth of the Golden Age to
derive his view of the classless society. He used JudeoChristian messianic ideology to envision the “prophetic
role and soteriological [world saving] function” of
the proletariat. Marx also used the myth of the battle
between Good and Evil to predict the “total victory of
the former” (1959: 206-207). Eliade’s larger point was
that even in modern, presumably secularized society, we
find ourselves drawn to “little religions” and “political
mystiques” (207).
Gustave Le Bon, an early social psychologist,
provides a reason why. Rather than emphasizing the
Even Bernie Sanders, whose campaign we also examined but will
not report on in detail here, drew fire for being a cult leader. Criticism
sometimes came from people who actually liked him but who thought he
was too self-centered for the good of party unity (e.g., Ambinder, 2016),
especially as the Democratic party approached its nominating convention.
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manipulative possibilities of political movements (and
religions), as Mosca did, or the myths to which we are
drawn, as Eliade did, Le Bon stressed how political
movements meet the psychological needs of people.
Le Bon claimed, in fact, that religion, in all its forms,
stems from people’s need to submit themselves to some
sort of faith. This faith “may apply to an invisible God,
to a wooden or stone idol, to a hero or to a political
conception . . . [In all these cases] its essence remains
religious” (Le Bon1960: 60). Le Bon thought that
modern societies, in which traditional religions tended
to lose their hold on the masses, are fertile ground for
secular religions like political movements, religions that
enabled “crowds” to express and focus their need to
believe.
Readers of this sociological journal may recall that
Durkheim, in Elementary Forms of the Religious Life
(1965/1915), suggested that religion has, as its functions,
the elevation of people from their individual lives and
connecting them to a collectivity to which they belong.
Religion need not entail the presence of supernatural
beings, because the divine, in Durkheim’s view, was
the collectivity itself. Durkheim argued that religion
consists of three key elements: sacred objects or entities,
ritual behaviors, and beliefs. While Durkheim did not
explicitly mention in Elementary Forms of Religious
Life that the political elements of a society sometimes
bleed into the religious, it is possible to imagine, as we
propose, that such elements may acquire the kinds of
sacred objects, ritual behaviors and beliefs that lead
them to look suspiciously religious.
To our knowledge, Emilio Gentile, was the first
theorist that we know of to devote a whole book to
viewing politics as religion. In fact, his Politics as Religion
(2006) argued explicitly that a political movement or
regime becomes a religion when it:
a. [C]onsecrates the primacy of a secular
collective entity by placing it at the center of a
set of beliefs and myths . . .
b. . . [I]mposes loyalty and devotion . . .
c. . .[I]nterprets its political action as a
messianic function to fulfill a mission of benefit
to all humanity.
d. Creates a political liturgy for the adoration
of the sacralized collective entity through the
cult of the person who embodies it . . . (13839).
Gentile studied fascism, as a form of political religion,
particularly in Italy. He concluded that there were
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two types of politics as religion in the modern world.
One was the political religion, which refers to the kind
of sacralization of politics that occurs in totalitarian
regimes. In such regimes, political religion sanctifies
the use of violence in the fight against political enemies,
among other things. The other type, civil religion,
sacralizes politics in democratic regimes (Gentile, 2006:
139 ff.).
As far as we can tell, no one has looked seriously
at political campaigns with an eye to whether they
constitute quasi-religious movements. This is the goal
of the current article.
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we supplemented our content analysis with statistical
analyses of data about a probability sample of voters
in the 2016 presidential election from the American
National Election Study. 3

Results

Having reviewed video recordings of five campaign
rallies for the two major candidates—Donald Trump
and Hillary Clinton--for the 2016 U. S. presidency, we
are prepared to compare and contrast these recordings
in terms of sacred objects, ritualistic behavior and the
expression of fundamental beliefs. In doing so, we, like
Cottingham (2015) in her study of sports fans’ behavior,
Methods
will frame these elements in terms of the degree of
We examined Youtube, and other available, recordings sacralization they evince. We believe that, in the context
of five campaign rallies each for Donald Trump and of campaign rallies, one cannot dichotomously classify
Hillary Clinton during the 2016 pre-election period.2 these elements as sacred or profane, but must place
We selected a purposive, nonprobability (e.g., non- them on a continuum between these two extremes.
random) sample of the longest recordings we could find
of rallies during 2016 for each candidate. Our rationale Sacred Objects
in doing this was that these recordings would give us the
fullest picture of what typically went on in them. We list
At one level, each of the campaigns seemed to have
the campaign rallies that we watched in the Appendix generated literal objects that held special meaning
at the end of this article. Tracking down the origin for pilgrims to the rallies. The red “Make American
of certain catch phrases, rituals and beliefs manifest Great Again” baseball-style caps worn often by Trump
at the campaign rallies frequently required additional and many of his supporters may be the most easily
observations, notably of the 2016 Democratic and remembered objects in the 2016 campaigns. However,
Republican nominating conventions.
the Trump campaign generated a substantial variety of
We employed a mixed-method approach. Primarily, other campaign-related paraphernalia—and, some of it,
we did a content analysis of the recordings. As we especially towards the end of the campaign, became a
watched them, we each took notes on three particular bit hostile.
phenomena: sacred objects, rituals, and beliefs. These
In January 2016 (at Rock Hill, South Carolina),
three phenomena were suggested by Durkheim’s classic there were relatively tame t-shirts (saying “Make
(1915/1965) work and were used by Cottingham (2015) America Great Again”) and posters (stating that “The
to organized her study of Pittsburgh Steelers fans, Silent Majority Stands with Trump”). By the time of
one hundred years later. Durkheim defined sacred the later rallies (at the end of October and in the first
objects as “those which . . . interdictions protect and week of November), the hats were almost as likely to
isolate.” He said rituals were “the rules of conduct have the name Trump written on them or an American
which prescribe how a man should comport himself in flag depicted on them. The posters also became much
the presence of sacred objects.” He also said “religious more differentiated. These posters bore messages like
beliefs are representations which express the nature “Trump-Pence,” which defined the constituency of
of sacred things and the relations which they sustain” their bearers (“Women for Trump” and “Veterans for
(1915/1965: 56).
Trump”), or that implied varying degrees of anger
To check whether some of the beliefs expressed by (“Drain the Swamp” and “Trump that Bitch”).
the candidates were shared by their followers, and not
We debated about classifying people, candidates
just the followers expressing approbation at rallies, and surrogates, as sacred objects because we wanted
2 We did the same for Bernie Sanders, but discovered that, because his to avoid objectifying any persons or group of people.
campaign did not last to the end of the election year, it was not strictly We decided, however, that such a classification was
comparable to the other two presidential candidates We will briefly
summarize our findings about the Sanders campaign at the end of the
paper.
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These data are provided online through the Survey Documentation and
Analysis posted by the University of California, Berkeley in 2017.
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unavoidable. In our defense, we reiterate that theorists
like Le Bon have paved the way for doing this. Le Bon
(1960: 60) suggested that religious faith “may apply to
an invisible God, to a wooden or stone idol, [or] to a
hero.” He also pointed out that, occasionally, political
candidates seem to invite such treatment.
To one degree or another, the goal of many political
campaigns is to elevate people, usually the candidates
themselves, to the level of sacred objects—and, in many
cases, to portray others—often opponents—either as
simply unholy or as devils incarnate. Trump rallies
provided many examples of both efforts. At an October
31 rally, for example, Trump was introduced by former
college basketball coach Bobby Knight who said he
thought of Trump as “Saint Donald.”
Trump did not require surrogates to point out his
near mythical status. At earlier rallies, like one in Rock
Hill, South Carolina, on January 18, 2016, he suggested
that he, Cincinnatus-like4, had been chosen [by
himself?] to lead a movement against the Washington
establishment. Trump stated: “I enjoyed my job [in real
estate; on television?]; I did it well.” He also implied that
he would be willing to make this sacrifice (of seeking
the presidency) for the people.
On the other hand, Trump was famous for vilifying
opponents. Sometimes he did this with snide asides
(as in the January rally where he chided his remaining
Republican opponents as well as Clinton for using
teleprompters and not “speak[ing] from the heart . . .
and brain,” as he did). At other times, he used full-on
assaults. For example, in an October rally in Cincinnati,
he called Clinton a “corrupt person,” asserting that
“She should be locked up” and that, when he became
President, “I will ask my Attorney General to look into
her crimes.”
By the end of her campaign, Clinton’s followers had
also accumulated a fair number of clothing-worthy
slogans and images (“I’m with her,” “Hillary 2016
[with an image of Rosie the Riveter],” “Clinton-Kane,”
and, perhaps, most provocatively, “Nasty Woman”)
and poster-worthy (“USA,” “Stronger Together,” “I
Will Vote,” “Clinton-Kane,” and “Love Trumps Hate”)
slogans.
Clinton was fairly good at tooting her own horn, but,
in doing so—as when she suggested she’d demonstrated
her endurance by standing next to Trump for over four
and a half hours during three debates—she sometimes
Cincinnatus, a patrician in the early Roman Republic, was reputedly
begged by his fellow citizens to give up his retirement as a farmer, assume
complete control of the state, and vanquish an invading enemy. After he
did all this, Cincinnatus is said to have walked away from public life for
good.
4

4
seemed slightly defensive. Trump had, after all, accused
her of not having sufficient energy for the presidency.
Perhaps trying to avoid the appearance of selfaggrandizement that Trump more clearly embraced,
Clinton sometimes seemed more comfortable having
surrogates sing her praises. Barack Obama did this at
the Democratic National Convention in July, and at
other rallies during the campaign, when he said that
“there has never been a man or a woman—not me, not
Bill, nobody—more qualified than Hillary Clinton to
serve as president of the United States of America.”
Other surrogates pointed to specific issues on which
Clinton was “on the side of the angels” while Trump
was on the opposite side. In a Miami rally in October,
for example, Al Gore claimed, “[W]hen it comes to the
most urgent issue facing this country and the world,
Hillary Clinton will make solving the climate crisis a top
national priority. Her opponent, based on ideas he has
presented, would take us toward a climate catastrophe.”
In Manchester, New Hampshire near the end of the
campaign, Elizabeth Warren observed, “Hillary is ready
to fight for us. Are you willing to fight for Hillary?”
At a North Carolina rally in October, Michelle Obama
had many positive things to say about Clinton. One
comment that was uniquely her own was: “First Ladies,
we rock!” Surrogates like the Obamas, Warren and
Gore sometimes seemed to assume the role of disciples,
preaching Clinton’s worthiness for high office. They
often shared the stage, with Clinton while she would
simply nod her head in agreement.
These shared appearances meant that Clinton spent
some time returning the favor, making her surrogates
look a bit saintly, while hinting that her opponent was
not. Gore, she observed, had devoted much of his life
fighting man-made climate change--had won, in fact,
the Nobel Peace Prize in 2007. She pointed out that
Elizabeth Warren and Maggie Hassan (then governor of
New Hampshire, campaigning to be New Hampshire’s
next U.S. senator) “fight for you every day.” But she also
regularly tried to take luster from Trump’s candidacy.
For example, in New Hampshire, Clinton stated that,
while Trump claimed that he “knows more than the
generals, I don’t think so!” Thus did Clinton, somewhat
like Trump, try to paint the election as an apocalyptic
battle between, if not good and evil, then the qualified
and the unqualified.
Rituals
The rituals evident at these rallies, at least as much
as we saw of the rallies, were largely confined to music
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played and crowd chants. Trump usually walked to her joint rally with Al Gore, when she cut the crowd
and from the stage, for example, accompanied by the short by raising her open hand, as if to say “Stop,” and
national anthem, the “Battle Hymn of the Republic,” or, continued with, “This is really important.”
ironically, the London Bach Choir’s choral introduction
to the Rolling Stones’ “You Can’t Always Get What Beliefs
you Want.” The latter two, at least, might have given
listeners the impression they were at a church service,
One of the most daunting stumbling blocks in
rather than at a political gathering. Clinton, too, Cottingham’s (2015) observational study of Pittsburgh
might be introduced by the national anthem. Just as Steeler fans was that observation alone is a tricky guide
frequently she would walk up to Journey’s “Don’t Stop to understanding people’s, especially football fans’
Believin’ (Small Town Girl),” probably emphasizing her beliefs. Without being able to ask questions of those
humble origins. In later rallies, Clinton also walked being observed, the researcher cannot be sure of what
out to “Brave,” by Sara Boreiles, a song that advocates they hold dear. Observing film of political rallies, on
“speakin’ up” to “someone’s lack of love.”
the other hand, provided us with a more reliable way
For Trump, what had been simple “Trump, Trump, of determining what convictions motivated candidates
Trump” chants and “Who’s going to pay for the and, presumably, their followers. However, in this
Wall”/”Mexico” call and responses in January at Rock section, we augment our observations with data from
Hill morphed, by October and November, into many the American National Election in 2016 to help
iterations of “Lock Her Up,” “Drain the Swamp,” “USA,” determine how much Trump and Clinton followers did
“All Talk No Action,” “Build the Wall,” “Jobs, Jobs, Jobs.” indeed differ in their beliefs.
By the end, Trump was sharing information about
As good researchers know, the validity of what a
his part in the creation of such mantras. At a rally in person says depends, among other things, on how
Phoenix, Arizona, on October 29th, for example, he deeply s/he believes in what is being said and whether
asserted that when his people brought the “drain the s/he intends to be truthful (Adler and Clark, 2015: 215).
swamp” concept to him, he didn’t like it at first, but Thus, the fact that Trump criticized other candidates for
admitted: “Now I like it.”
using a teleprompter in January 2016 rallies, and then
Clinton gave the impression of being less calculating used them himself in October and November rallies,
about inspiring the chants that emerged from her may not be an indicator of Trump’s flock’s changing
galleries, but, since some of them, like “Deal Me In,” beliefs about teleprompters. Rather, one might conclude
mimicked lines in her speeches (“Mr. Trump accused that his flock’s faith in him, not his stated beliefs, could
me of playing the woman card. Well, if fighting for withstand such mild contradictions. In fact, at a Sioux
women’s health care and paid family leave and equal City, Iowa, rally in January 2016, Trump famously said:
pay is playing the woman card, then deal me in”), she “I could stand in the middle of Fifth Avenue and shoot
clearly had a hand in some of them. In her later rallies, somebody, and I wouldn’t lose any voters, OK?” Yet
Clinton also gave her audiences time to chant this, as there did seem to be some fundamental beliefs shared
well as “Love Trumps Hate.” Her crowds also, more by Trump and his followers--beliefs that forged the
spontaneously, chanted things like “Hillary, Hillary, loyal bond.
Hillary,” and “We Love You, Hillary” at the later rallies.
Trump announced his candidacy on June 16, 2015,
And, of course, when Michelle Obama spoke on Hillary’s and simultaneously announced his commitment to
behalf at various rallies, as she did at the Democratic building a wall between Mexico and the United States.
Convention, crowds would often join in when she said, In doing so, he laid the foundation of his campaign on
“When they go low, we go high.”
an anti-immigrant theme that struck a chord for many
Trump’s and Clinton’s responses to crowd chants Americans (e.g., Rocha, Sabetta and Clark, 2017). Trump
were noticeably different. Both candidates would reiterated this theme at all the rallies we observed. This,
typically pause to acknowledge the participation, but plus the promise to bring and hold onto well-paying jobs
Trump would happily stop what he was saying and walk for the working class Americans, may well account for
around the stage, looking at and pointing to various the ironclad loyalty that seems to have bound Trump to
crowd members, seemingly egging them on. On the around 40 percent of American voters both before the
other hand, while Clinton would usually stop, smile, election and since. Some of Trump’s proposed policy
and occasionally would seemingly admonish the crowd changes were related to these two themes or goals
for getting off topic. She noticeably did the latter at (e.g., abandoning trade agreements like NAFTA and
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the TPP, developing the country’s infrastructure, and
cutting business taxes). Some proposed policies were
less clearly so (e.g., rebuilding the military, taking care
of law enforcement and veterans, saving the Second
Amendment, appointing Justices to the Supreme
Court “that will uphold the Constitution,” and ending
Common Core). The belief in the salience of limiting
immigration and creating jobs seems to have been
crucial, almost sacred, to Trump and his followers.
Towards the end of the campaign Clinton regularly
argued that the government should not be making
money off students (via high interests on loans) and
that college and university should be tuition free for
students whose families made under $125,000 a year.
She also advocated raising the minimum wage, taxing
millionaires and corporations, and an infrastructure
enhancement program that would provide jobs.
However, much of Clinton’s eventual position was
defined in contradiction to Trump’s nativist stance
and, more generally, in contradiction to his messages
of exclusivity. In a rally in Grand Rapids, Michigan the
day before the election, she said simply: “Anger is not a
plan.” She also said that the election was about choosing
between “division and unity in our country.”
Based on candidates’ expressed beliefs, one can derive
certain inferences about their followers’ probable beliefs
as well. However, enthusiastic responses by rally goers,
conceivably the most fervid followers, may not translate
into patterned differences in the beliefs of the candidates’
followers. Using American National Election Study
(ANES) data, we were able to determine that they
often did. Based on their candidates’ statements, one
might expect that Trump voters would be more averse
to immigration than Clinton voters. The ANES data
suggest that, in general, they were. Table 1 compares
Trump and Clinton voters in terms of their openness
to immigration. The ANES asked respondents: “What
should immigration levels be?” Almost 46 percent
(45.7%) of people who voted for Trump said they should
be “decreased a lot,” while only 8.8 percent of Clinton
voters said this. Conversely, 10.9 percent of Clinton
voters said that immigration levels should be increased
a lot, while only 1.7 percent of Trump voters said they
should. (See Table 1.)
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Table 1. Trump and Clinton Voters Answer the Question:
“What Should Immigration Levels Be?”

Response Options

Trump Voters

Clinton Voters

Increased a lot		
			

1.7%		
(19)		

10.9%
(136)

Increased a little
			

2.7%		
(30)		

16.5%
(205)

Left the same		
			

25.9%		
(290)		

50.1%
(623)

Decreased a little
			

24.0%		
(269)		

13.6%
(169)

Decreased a lot		
			

45.7%		
(513)		

8.8%
(109)

Total			
			

100%		
(1121)		

100%
(1242)

Source: American National Election Study, 2016. Note: Ns
are in parentheses.

Regarding increasing the minimum wage, one might
also expect that Clinton voters would be more likely
than Trump voters to have supported it. The data in
Table 2 show that they were. Specifically, 83.5 percent
of Clinton voters favored raising the minimum wage,
while only 45.0 percent of Trump voters did. (See Table
2.)
The ANES data revealed other substantial differences
between Trump and Clinton voters registered.
Regarding favoring raising taxes on millionaires, a
large majority (84.9%) of Clinton voters approved. In
contrast, less than half (47.8%) of Trump voters did so.
More than half (56.4%) of Trump voters responded that
immigration was extremely or very likely to “take away
jobs,” while only 18.9% of Clinton voters felt this way.
The ANES did not ask questions that allowed tests of
expected differences in attitudes on all beliefs professed
by the candidates; but the tests that were possible did
suggest that the beliefs of Trump and Clinton voters were
so different that these voters seemed almost to belong to
two different, perhaps rival, churches. For an empirical
account of other attitudes and beliefs that differentiated
Trump and Clinton voters, we refer readers to an article
that appeared in volume three of Sociology between the
Gaps (Rocha, Sabetta and Clark 2017).
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Table 2. Trump and Clinton Voters’ Answers to the Question:

“Should the Minimum Wage be Raised?”

					
Response Options
Trump Voters

Clinton Voters

Raised			
			

45.0%		
(502)

83.5%
(1046)

Kept the same		
			

45.4%		
(506)		

14.5%
(181)

Lowered		
			

2.7%		
(30)		

0.6%
(8)

Eliminated		
			

6.9%		
(77)		

1.4%
(18)

Total			
			

100%		
(1114)		

100%
(1252)

Source: American National Election Study, 2016. Note: Ns
are in parentheses.

CONCLUSION
Our analysis examined sacred objects, rituals and
beliefs in the 2016 presidential campaigns of Donald
Trump and Hillary Clinton. It provides insight into how
aspects of a campaign’s culture undergo sacralization
to greater or lesser degrees. We see, for example, how
surrogates like Bobby Knight and the Obamas labored
to turn Trump and Clinton, respectively, into sacred
objects. We also see how Trump worked to make
himself look Cincinnatus-like, if not divine.
The rituals we observed in the campaigns also struck
us as differentially sacralized, or at least subject to
differential attempts to seem religious in nature. In the
“Battle Hymn of the Republic” and the London Bach
Choir’s introduction to the Rolling Stones’ “You Can’t
Always Get What You Want,” someone in the Trump
campaign was certainly trying to create a sacred air
to the candidate’s comings and goings. It’s not clear
whether or not the version of “Battle Hymn” is the one
sung by the Mormon Tabernacle choir in the Mormon
Tabernacle; but, it could have been. The London Bach
Choir’s introduction to the Stone’s song was clearly
designed to echo inspirational classical chorale music.
In using “Don’t Stop Believin’ (Small Town Girl)” and
“Brave” to introduce Clinton, much more secular foci
were evoked.
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Evidently, Trump took pride in the chants that
constituted notable ritualized activities on the part of
his supporters at his rallies. As soon as a “Lock Her
Up” or “Build the Wall” chant would begin, he would
typically stop whatever he was saying and walk around.
He often turned to the people behind him and let the
chanting behavior run its course. Trump took credit
for giving his stamp of approval to some chants, such as
“Drain the Swamp.” Clinton would frequently stop and
smile in reaction to a “Hillary, Hillary, Hillary” chant,
but, as we have mentioned, she actually discouraged
crowd participation at a rally about climate change.
The beliefs espoused by the candidates, at least as
evidenced in the rallies we watched, often seemed fairly
fundamental, maybe even sacred in their nature and
presentation. Of course (in Grand Rapids, Michigan) we
observed throwaway ideas, especially, for example, from
Trump, about the value of not using teleprompters. But
about his two fundamental themes, he was consistent, if,
given his background, apparently at odds with his own
historical interests: the needs to limit immigration and
to provide well-paying jobs. According to Ballesteros
(2017), Trump is thought to have used immigrant
labor to save money on the construction of Trump
Tower. Clinton’s fundamental beliefs are less easy to
summarize or, perhaps, too numerous to do so quickly.
Clinton frequently suggested to crowds that they look
for her policy positions on her website: a site that
enumerated positions on forty-one issues ranging from,
alphabetically, “A Fair Tax System” to “Workforce Skills
and Job Training.” Our analysis of ANES data indicates
that, to the extent that we could measure them, the
belief systems of voters for Trump and Clinton were
very different.
In general, then, both campaigns evinced, through
their rallies, elements of quasi-religions, although they
did so to differing degrees. Donald Trump’s campaign
seemed most clearly to embrace quasi-religiousness.
Many of Trump’s followers wore the red baseball cap
with the “Make America Great Again” logo and this was
by far the most obvious “thing” that followers sacralized
in the campaigns. Trump seemed not at all averse to
defining himself, and being defined, as a sacred object.
And the rituals that played out at his rallies were, while
varied, strongly encouraged and almost sacramental
in nature. Hilary Clinton seemed more reluctant to
embrace the sacralization of her campaign, although
she did not reject it entirely.
In concluding this article, we would like to report
that we did an analysis of five Bernie Sanders rallies to
get added perspective on our findings. Perhaps because
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of the shorter length of his campaign, Sanders followers
never seemed to amass the collection of sacred objects
that both Trump and Clinton supporters did, nor were
their ritualized chants anywhere near as insistent as
those of Trump and Clinton rally attendees. Part of the
reason for the relative absence of these elements of quasireligion may be understood by Sanders’ discouragement
of them. Even more than Clinton, Sanders seemed
to disapprove of ritualized behavior. He would, for
example, raise what seemed to be a warning hand when
his followers began to chant, “Bernie, Bernie, Bernie.”
Even more than Clinton, Sanders gave the impression
that he wanted to get back to his presentation. This
behavior may either be taken as evidence that his
campaign had fewer religious elements than the other
two candidates or that what Sanders really valued were
the beliefs (not the objects or rituals) of his campaign.
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